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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 USNATO 2937

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC, NPG
SUBJECT: NPG-DRAFT PERREPS REPORT ON FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAM

REF: USNATO 2875

1. MISSION PROVIDES IN PARAS 2 AND 3 BELOW A COVER LETTER FROM SYG LUNS DATED 22 MAY 1975 ENCLOSING THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAM PREPARED BY THE NPG STAFF GROUP(REFTEL). NPG PER REPS WILL REVIEW THE DRAFT ON JUNE 3 WITH A VIEW TOWARD AGREEING ON A REPORT AS A MINISTERIAL AGENDA DOCUMENT. ACTION REQUEST-
ED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS OR APPROVAL OF THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT IN PARA 3 BELOW PRIOR TO JUNE 3.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF SYG LUNS' COVER LETTER:

AT THEIR MEETING AT AIRLIE HORSE IN NOVEMBER, 1969 THEMINISTERS OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GRUP APPROVED(1) A WORK PROGRAMME FOR THE STUDY OF FOLLOW-ON TACTICALUSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH CONSISTS OF THREE DISTINCT PHASES.
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AS A RESULT OF THE PHASE II EFFORT (COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC DATA INPUTS, SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS AND IDENTIFIC-ATION OF THE POLICY QUESTIONS), AND AD HOC STUDY TEAM PREPARED A REPORT (2) THAT WAS CIRCULATED AS AN NPG DOCUMENT

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ON 27TH MARCH, 1975.

2. IT WAS LATER AGREED (3) THAT, IN FULFILMENT OF THE MONITORING TASK GIVEN TO THEM BY THE MINISTERS AT THE SAME MEETING, THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WOULD SUBMIT THEIR OBSERVATIONS ON THIS MATTER FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION, TOGETHER WITH THE STUDY TEAM REPORT. ATTACHED IS A DRAFT REPORT ONPHASE II OF THE WORK PROGRAMME ON FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH THE NPG STAFF GOUP HAS PREPARED FOR NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' CONSIDERATION.

3. THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ARE REQUESTED TO CONSIDER THE ATTACHED DRAFT AT THEIR MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 3 RD JUNE, 1975 WITH THE VIEW TO AGREEING ON A REPORT TO BE CIRULATED SHORTLY THEREAFTER AS A MINISTERIAL AGENDA DOCUMENT.

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(1) NPG/D(69)9(REVISED), 24TH NOVEMBER 1969
(2) NPG/D(75)1, 27TH MARCH, UT

(3) NPG/D(72)5, 24TH APRIL, 1972, PARAGRAPH 8(E)

END TEXT

3. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT:

I. PURPOSE

1. THIS REPORT IDENTIFIES, FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION, A NUMBER OF POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO THE REPORT ON PHASE II OF THE WORK PROGRAMME ON FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1) AND MAKES SUGGESTIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE III.

II. BACKGROUND

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2. IN NOVEMBER 1969, THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP APPROVED THE PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO (2) AS POLICY GUIDANCE FOR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND AS A DIRECTIVE TO NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. AT THE SAME MEETING, MINISTERS RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR A STUDY OF FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO EXAMINE THE PHASES OF TACTICAL USE SUBSEQUENT TO INITIAL USE BY NATO AND TO EXPLORE NATO RESPONSES TO AN INITIAL TACTICALUSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE WARSAW PACT. RATHER THAN ATTEMPT THIS TASK IN A SINGLE COMPREHENSIVE STUDY, THEY AGREED TO PROPROASLS PUT FORWARD BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHICH DEFINED (3) THE OBJECTIVES, GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS AND BROAD STRUCTURE OF AN OVERALL WORK

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PROGRAMME TO BE CARRIED OUT IN A SERIES OF INTERRELATED STEPS.

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(1) NPG/D(75)1, 27TH MARCH, 1975. HEREAFTER REFEREED TO AS PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT.
(2) DPC/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970.
(3) NPG/D(69)9(REVISED), 24TH NOVEMBER, 1969, ANNEX.
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3. THE FOLLOW, USE WORK PROGRAMME WAS DIVIDED INTO THREE MAJOR COMPONENTS (1):

(A) PHASE I: A SERIES OF INDIVIDUAL STUDIES TO EXAMINE IN DETAIL THE EFFECT OF THE VARIOUS FOLLOW-ON USE OPTIONS ON THE TACTICAL EVOLUTION OF SPECIFIC SITUATIONS; (SUMMARIES OF PHASE I STUDIES ARE CONTAINED IN ANNEX TO PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT).

(B) PHASE II: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PHASE I STUDIES, SYNTHESIS OF THEIR FINDINGS AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE POLICY QUESTIONS;

(C) PHASE III: FORMULATION OF PROPOSED POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FOR ENDORSEMENT BY THE NUCLEAR DEFENCE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND APPROVAL AND PROMULGATIION BY THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE.
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(1) NPG/D(71)7, 27 JULY , 1971

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4. PHASE I OF THE WORK PROGRAMME CAME TO A CONCLUSION IN MAY 1973, WITH MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE LAST OF EIGHT REGIONAL STUDIES, IN WHICH ALL NPG MEMBER NATIONS HAD PARTICIPATED, TOGETHER WITH THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. FOLLOWING A DECISION (2) BY THE MINISTERS IN MAY 1972 TO INITIATE PHASE II AS SUGGESTED BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES (3), AN AD HOC STUDY TEAM COMPOSED OF PARTICIPANTS FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM DEVELOPED A PHASE II REPORT. A PRELIMINARY VERSION OF THIS PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT WAS CIRCULATED AND WAS DISCUSSED BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ON 20TH FEBRUARY, 1975. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND WRITTEN COMMENTS RECIEVED FROM MEMBER NATIONS, THE STUDY TEAM THEN FINALISED ITS REPORT.

5. SINCE ITS INCEPTION, THE FOLLOWAON USE WORK PROGRAMME HAS BEEN AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT PART OF NPG WORK. ITS USEFULNESS IN CONNECTION WITH PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE WORK IN NATO IS EVIDENT. THE PROGRAMME HAS GENERATED OTHER IMPORTANT STUDIES ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITAY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(4) AND ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL
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DEVELPMENTS CONCERNING TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (5). A RECOMMENDATION OF HOW PHASE II OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK MIGHT BE INITIATED WITHIN THE BROADER FRAMEWORK OF NPG ACTIVITIES IS FORWARDED IN PART IV BELOW.

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(2) NPG/D(72)7, 26TH MAY, 1972, PARAGRAPH 6
(3) NPG/D(72)5, 24TH APRIL, 1972
(4) DPC/D(74)18, 5TH AUGUST, 1974
(5) NPG/D(74)3, 10TH APRIL, 1974

III. DISCUSSION

CONCLUSIONS OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT

6. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT ARE (1):

"(A) FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOES NOT PROVIDE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO AN ADEQUATE ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE

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POSTURE. IN A SITUATION WHERE DETERRENCE HAD
FAILED AND CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE FALTERED,
THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH USE
WOULD BE CIRICIALLY DEPENDENT UPON ENEMY PERCEPTION OF NATO'S
DEFENSIVE EFFORT AND HIS CONSEQUENT REACTION.

(B) FOLLOW-ON USE COULD, HOWEVER, PROVIDE AN
INVALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPEL THE ENEMY
TO REASSESS THE RISK OF FUTHER ESCALATION
UP TO AND INCLUDING THE STRATEGIC LEVEL AND
SO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW. AS IN
INITIAL USE, THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENT WOULD
BE FOR AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONVINCING SINGAL,
ALTHOUGH IN THE FOLLOWAON PHASE THE ALLIANCE
MIGHT NEED TO PROVIDE MORE ESCALATORY
EVIDENCE OF IS RESOLUTION.

(C) ABOVE ALL, THE KNOWN POSSESSION OF SUCH
WEAPONS AND THE EVIDENT ABILITY TO EXECUTE
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A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR THEIR USE PLAYS
A KEY ROLE IN ENSURING THE ALLIANCE DETERRENCE
DOES NOT FAIL. THOUGH A SUBSTITUTE FOR NEITHER,
IT CONSTITUTES A NECESSARY LINK BETWEEN THE
ALLIANCE'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES AND ITS
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES".

7. WE AGREE WITH THESE FUNDAMTNTAL CONCLUSIONS AND
SUGEST THEYBE AFFORDED CLOSE CONSIDERATION BY POLITICL
AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THIS REPORT SEEKS TO HIGHLIGHT
CERTAIN KEY ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE HAVE
SPECIAL RELEVANCE FOR NATO POLICY AND WILL BE OF PARTICULAR
INTEREST TO MINISTERS. IN DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT, MINISTERS
SHOULD BEAR IN MIND LIMITATIONS IN THE SCOPE OF THE PHASE I
STUDIES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THEIR
ANALYSES. FOR EXAMPLE, THESE STUDIES, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR
TERMS OF REFERENCE,FOCUSSED ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF FOLLOW-ON
USE, RESULTING IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF
POLITICAL-MILITARY INTERACTIONS (2). FURTHER, SINCE THE

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(1) NPG/D(75)1, PARAGRAPH 81
(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 16

PHASE I STUDIES WERE DESIGNED TO EXAMINE THE FOLLOW-ON USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO, THEY HAD TO ASSUME ON OPENING
SITUATION IN WHICH NATO NECESSARILY HAD TO RESORT TO THE
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHERE DETERRENCE FAILED, CONVENTIONAL
DEFNCE PROVED TO BE INADEQUATE, AND INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS DID NOT ENDUCE THE AGGRESSOR TO CEASE HIS ATTACK

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AND WITHDRAWA(1). THESE SCENARIOS, WHICH ARE IN NO WAY
UNREALISTIC, PLACED NATO IN UNFAVOURABLE CIRCUMSTANCES FROM
THE OUTSET. HOWEVER, WE WOULD CALL ATTENTION TO THE PHASE II
STUDY TEAM'S COMMENT THAT THE OTCOME IN MILITARY TERMS OF
THE PHASE I STUDIES IS CRITICALLY DEPENDENT, INTER ALIA,
UPON THE ASSUMPTIONS; I.E., THE WARSAW PACT HAD CONVENTIONAL
SUPERIORITY, WAS ABLE TO RETURN TO THE ENGAGEMENT, AND WAS
PREPARED TORESPOND WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF HIS OWN. WHILE
IN NO WAYLESSENING THE VALUE OF THE PHASE I STUDIES AND THE
PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNISE THE
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WIDE RANGE OF VARIABLES WHICH CULD AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF
NUCLEAR ENGAGEMENTS. WE WOULD OBSERVE, THEREFORE, THAT THE
CONCLUSIONS OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT MAY NOT BE
EXHAUSTIVE, IN THAT OTHER ASSUMPTIONS MAY HAVE LED TO
FURTHER INSIGHT.

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CONVENTINAL DEFENCE AND USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

8. A PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIOION IN THE PHAE II STUDY TEAM
REPORT IS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO
CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND CANNOT REPLACE THEM. THIS CONCLUSION,
WHICH WE ENDORSE, SUPPORTS CURRENT NATO DEFENCE CONCEPT (2),
AND EMPHASISIES THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING ADEQUATE
CONVENTIONAL FORCES CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING AND EXPLOITING
NUCLEAR OPERATIOS (3). ALTHOUGH CONVENTINAL FORCES AND

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THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BOTH ARE ESSENTIALELEMENTS OF THE
NATO TRIAD, AND NEITHER ONE CAN REPLACE THE OTHER,WE BLIEVE
IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNISE THAT THE GREATER THE CAPABILITY
OF NATO CONVENTIOAL FORCES TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ATTACK, THE
HIGHER THE THRESHOLD FOR THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS BY NATO.SIMILARLY, WE AGREE WITH THE PHASE II STUDY
TEAMM REPORT THAT CONVENTINAL FORCES HAVE IMPORTANT ROLES TO
PLAY AT EVERY STAGE OF A CONFLICT, NOTABLY CONVENTIONAL
DEFENCE, AND EXPLOITATION OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS. FURTHERMORE,WE BELIEVE THAT THE THREAT POSED
BY THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD AFFECT ALL MILTAY OPERATIOS

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(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 19
(2) NPG/D(73)16, 8TH NOVEMBER, 1973, PARAGAPH 20
(3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT,PARAGRAPH 75(C)

IN THE THEATRE, INCLUDING STRICTLY CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS, AND
SIZE AND DISPOSITION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES COULD
INFLUENCE TIMING,SCALE OF USE AND LOCATION AND NATURE OF
TARGETS IN NUCLEAR OPERATIOS. FOR EXAMPLE, GIVEN THE WARSAW
PACT'S CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY
ASSUMED IN THE PHASE I STUDIES, CONTROLLED AND LIMITED
NUCLEAR EXCHANGE COULD LEAD TO A SITUATION IN WHICH AVAILABLE
REINFORCEMENTS MIGHT BECOME A DECISIVE FACTOR (1), SUGGESTING
THAT THE CHOICE OF THE TYPE OF TARGETS TO STRIKE, E.G., THE
RESERVES, MIGHT BE VERY IMPORTANT.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS OF FOLLOW-ON USE.

9. POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THE PHASE II
STUDY TEAM REPORT RECGONISES THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN RELATION TO MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
WHEN IT STATES THAT "THE CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY ACTION
HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN RELATION NOT JUST TO SPECIFIC MILTARY
GOALS BUT ABOVE ALL TO THE ULTIMATE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF
PERSUADING THE ENEMY TO CEASE HIS AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW". (2)
ANY NEED FOR NATO TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD STEM FROM
INABILITY TO ACHIEVE ITS DEFENSIVE OBJECTIVES WITH CONVENTIONAL
FORCES ALONE. SINCE IT CANNOT BE FORESEEN WHEN OR WHERE THIS
SITUATION MIGHT OCCUR, THE NATURE AND TIME FRAME OF, AND
INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN, NATO'S INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE DETERMINED IN ADVANCE. HOWEVER,
IF NATO'S INITIAL USE, WHATEVER ITS MAGNITUDE AND DURATION,
AND NATO'S PARALLEL POLICAL EFFORTS FAILED TO INDUCE AN
AGRESSOR TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK
AND WITHDRAW, NATO WILL INEVEITABLY HAVE TO TAKE NUCLEAR
FOLLOW-ON MEASURES (3). THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT
CONCLUDES (4) THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR FOLLOW-ON USE TO

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CONVEY TO THE ADVERSAY AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONVINCING SIGNAL
OF THE RISK HE WILL FACE IF HE DOES NOT CEASE HIS AGGRESSION,
MIGHT REQUIRE THAT THE FOLLOW-ON PHASE PROVIDE MORE ESCALATORY
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EVIDENCE OF NATO'S RESOLUTION.

10. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS.
MINISTERS WILL RECALL THAT IN THEPHASE I STUDIES, NATO'S
INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS GENERALLY TOOK PLACE ON A
SCALE SUCH THAT THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE MOMENTUM WAS NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED, THUS PERMITTING HIM THE OPTION OF
CONTINUING HIS ADVANCE CONVENTIONALYY. INITIAL USE, AT SUCH
A SCALE, MIGHT CONVEY TO THE ENEMY LACK OF RESOLVE BY NATO
TO DEFENCD ITS TERRITORY, THUS ENTAILING LARGER SACLE FOLLOW-ON

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(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGAAPH 39
(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 29
(3) DPC/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970, PARAGRAPH 89
(4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 66, 81(B)

USEC IN LATER STATES OF A CONFLICT WHEN WARSAW PACT RESPONSE
"IN KIND" COULD HAVE A MORE SERIOUS EFFECT ONNATO. AS NOTED
IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT
INITIAL USE IN ONE SET OF CIRCUMSTATNCES COULD BE ON A LARGER
SCALE THAN FOLLOW-ON USE IN ANOTHER, BUT FOLLOW-ON USE BY
NATO THAT DID NOT PROVIDE A MORE EMPHATIC SIGNAL THAN INITIAL
USE(1) MAY BE EVEN LESS CREDIBLE, AND, THEREFORE, ALSO
UNSUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING AN ENEMY TO TERMINATE HIS ATTACK.
ON THE OTHER HAND, EITHER INITIAL OR FOLLOW-ON USE ON A SCALE
WITH SUFFICIENT MILITARY EFFEDT TO DISRUPT THE ENEMY'S
ADVANCE, COULD CAUSE HIM TO REASSESS HIS OBJECTIVES AND PROBABLE
COSTS, FORCING H HIM TO TAKE A DELIBERATE DECISION EITHER TO
CEASE HIS ATTACK OR TO RETALIATE "IN KIND" OR ESCALTE.
THEREFORE, THE SCALE OF USE INCLUDING, INTER ALIA, THE SELECTION
OF TARGETS, WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT BOTH IN MILITARY
EFFECTIVENESS AND IN ENSURING THAT THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE IS
ACHIEVED. NATO WOULD NEED TO WEIGH CAREFULLY SUCH
CONSIDERATIONS IN ANY DECISION ON EMPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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11. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT CALLS ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF CAPABILITIES OF NNATO NUCLEAR FORCES FOR ACHIEVEING NATO'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES (2). RELATIVE CAPABILITIES IN WEAPONRY, TARGET ACQUISITIO, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND SURVIVABILITY OF FORCES ARE IMPORTANT VARIABLES WHICH COULD SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE THE MILTARY EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOME OF THESE FACTORS ARE BEING EXAMINED IN THE NPG STUDY ON THE POLTICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS AND ECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (3), WHICH COULD PROVIDE IMPORTANT INSIGHTS FOR NATO'S FORCE PLANNING AND POLICY FOR THE USE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR EAPONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ENEMY'S REPONSE IN AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF NUCLEAR ENGAGEMENTS IS RECOGNISED BY THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, WHICH CONCLUDES (4) THAT THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVE-NESS OF FOLLOW-ON USE WOULD BE CRITICALLY DEPENDENT UPON ENEMY PERCEPTION OF NATO'S DEFNESIVE EFFORT AS WELL AS HIS CONSEQUENT REACTION. THUS, NATO STRATEGY AND POLICY FOR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST CONTINUE TO MAKE PROVISIONS FOR NATO TO BE ABLE TOEXCALATE AS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES(5).
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(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 67 AND 70
(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 30-33
(3) NPG/D(74)3, 10TH APRIL, 1974
(4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 81(A)
(5) MC14/3(FINAL, 16TH JANUARY, 1968, PARAGRAPHS 17 AND 22
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12. IN THIS CONNECTION AND IN CONSONANCE WITH PAST PRACTIC, THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM DID NOT ATTEMPT TO DEFINCE THE UPPOER LIMITS OF FOLLOW-ON USE (1), NOR DID IT EXAMINE INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AVAILABLE THEATRE OPTIONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR STRIKES. IN

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THIS REGARD, THE PLANNING BASE FOR EXECUTING SELECTIVE USE CAN BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE AS SACEUR'S SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PLANNING PROGRESSES. SELECTIVE USE UP TO A LIMIT WHERE DISDTICITION IS STILL POSSIBLE FROM GENERAL NUCLEAR RELEASE, AND INCLUDING LIMITED NUCLEAR PORTIONS FROM THE STRATEGIC ARESENAL (AS DISCUSSED IN RECENT NPG MEETINGS) ARE ESENTIAL CAPABILITIES IN NATO7S DETERRENT POSTURE.

13. POLITICAL OBJECTIVE AND USE IN EXTENDED GEOPGRAPHICAL AREAS. ESCLATION IN FOLLOW-ON USE COULD BE DEMONSTRATED ALSO THROUTH SELECTION OF TARGETS OF HIGH VALUE TO THE ENEMY AND THROUGH THE OPTION TO STRIKE IN AN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA(2). WE FURTHER NOTE THAT THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT STATED IN THE SUMMARY (3) THAT PREPAREDNESS FOR NUCLEAR USE IN AN EXTENDED GEOPGRAPHICAL AREA IS ONE OF THE BASES ON WHICH THE CREDIBILITY OF NATU'S STRATEGY RESTS. THIS OPTION, IN PARTUCULAR, COULD INTRODUCE AN IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT OF ESCALATION.

14. TIMING IN FOLLOW-ON USE. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT STATES THAT THE TIMING FOR FOLLOW-ON USE WOULD DEPEND UPON A COMBINATION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES WHICH ARE ULTIMATELY INSEPARABLE (4). HOWEVER, IT IS RECOGNISED THAT, IN NARROW TERMS, POLITICAL OBJECTIVES MIGHT, INCERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, BE IN CONFLICT WITH MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EARLY FOLLOW-ON USE, AND THAT SINCE ACTUAL SITUATIONS CANNOT BE PRE-DETERMINED, ONLY VERY GENERAL GUIDANCE COULD BE GIVEN. SUCH GUIDANCE COULD INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF A
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NUMBER OF FACTORS SUCH AS:

(A) THE NEED TO GIVE THE ENEMY TIME TO PERCEIVE NATO POLITICAL AIMS BALANCED AGAINST POSSIBLE MILITARY DISADVANTAGES OF DELIBERATELY INTRODUCING DELAYS BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE NUCLEAR OPERATIONS(5):

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(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAHP 74
(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 45,47,48,49,70, 75(E), 79
(3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGAPH 79
(4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 44
(5) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 44

(B) THE AGREED PRINCIPLE THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS LAST RESORT AFTER OR SHORTLY BEFORE THE EXHAUSTION OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FOECES;
(C) THE NECESSITY OF PRESERVING MILITARY EFFECIVENESS

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BY TIMELY USE WHERE FLEETING TARGETS MUST BE ATTACKED.

15. COLLATERAL DAMAGE. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM PREPORT CAUTIONS(1) THAT COLLATERAL DAMAGE DATA, INCLUDING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN THE PHASE I STUDIEES, JUST BE TREATED AS PROVIDING ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE RATHER THAN PRECISE FIGURES, IN VIEW OF THE HYPOTHETICAL AND ILLUSTRATIVE NATURE OF THE STUDIES AND THEIR ASSUMPTIONS. THE REPORT ALSO DRAWS ATTENTION TO VARIOUS TECHNIQUES USED IN SOME PHASE I STUDIES AND ALREADY AFAIALBLE TO NATO COMMANDDERS TO MINIMISE COLLATERAL DAMAGE (2). WE WELCOME THE ATTENTION DEVOTED TO THIS SUBJECT IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, AND BELIEVE THAT NATO7S PLANNING OF FORCES SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASISE THIS OBJECTIVE. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE NOTE THAT THE NPG STUDY NOW UNDERWAY (3) ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS MAY POINT TO IMPROVED POSSIBILITIES TO REDUCE AND CONTOL COLLATERAL DAMAGE, WHILE MAINTAINIG OR ENHANCING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS.

SELECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO STRATEGY
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16. DURING RECENT NPG MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS ON IMPLICATIONS OF NATO STRATEGY, THE IMPORTANCE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES, IN AN AREA OF STRAEGIC EQUIVALENCE, HAS LIKEWISH CONCLUDED (4) THAT THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR USE OPTION IS A CARDINAL COMPONENT IN NATO'S WOLE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND FELXIBILITY IN RESPONSE. FURTHERMORE, IT IS EVEIDENT THAT THE BASIC NATO MILITARY STRATEGY, MC 14/3, PROVIDES THE ALLIANCE WITH SUFFICIENT CONCEPTUAL FLEXIBILITY FOR A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 34 THROUGH 37, AND 75(B)
(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGAPH 75(B)
(3) NPG/D(74)3, 10TH APRIL, 1974
(4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 80

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17. WHILE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTING IN THE TIME OF CRISIS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT IT MUST SERVE TO ACHIEVE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE NATO AREA.FLEXIBILITY REFERS TO THE RANGE OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO NATO, AS WELL AS TO THE RELATED PROCESS THROUGH WHICH SUCH OPTIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED. IT NOT ONLY REQUIRES THE ABILITY TO COPE WITH VARIOUS TYPES OF MILITARY AGGRESSION, BUT ALSO REQUIRES NATO TO HAVE THE RESOLVE TO APPLY THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF MILITARY POWER. SUCH A STRATEGY EMPHAISIES FORWARD DEFNECE COUPLED WITH THE AIM OF TERMINATING HOSTILITIES AT THE LOWEST LEVEL POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH ACHIEVING NATO'S OBJECTIVES.

18. WITH RESPECT TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S STRATEGY IN A GIVEN SITUATION, ACCORDING TO THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, WOULD MOST PROBABLY START VFROM THE EXPECTATION (1) THAT WARSAW PACT INITIAL ATTCKS WOULD LILELYBE NON-NUCLEAR AND THAT SOVIET LEADERS, RECOGNISING THE CONSEQUENCSES OF GENERAL WAR, MAY BE RELUCTANT TO DELIBERATELY ESCALATE LIMITED CONFLICTS(2).
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THIS JUSTIFIES AN EMPLLYMENT POLICY PROVIDING FOR CONTROLLED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGNED TO LESSEN THE RISKS OF ESCALATION.SUCH USE MAY INVOLVE PHASISING BETWEEN INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON USE, AND IN SUBSEQUENT STAGES OF FOLLOW-ON USE, WHICH MAY HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING TIME TO ASSESS ENEMY REACTION.AS FOR MAGNITUDE OF USE, LOW-SCALE OPTIONS MAY CARRY LESS RISK OF RETALIATION, BUT MILITARILY MAY ACHIEVE LIMITED RESULTS, AND POLITICALLY MAY BE INTERPRETED BY THE ADVERSARY AS DEMONSTRATING LACK OF REESOLVE. ALTERNATIVELY, NATO MIGHT CHOOSE TOESCALATE MORE SHARPLY WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT MILITARY RESULTS SO AS TO GIVE STRONGER EVIDENCE OF THE ALLIANCE'S RESOLVE, ALTHOUGH SUCH ACTION MIGHT CARRY A GREATER RISK OF ESCALATION. MBOTH ALTERNATIVES ARE, OF COURSE, COMPATIBLE WITH NATO'S TRATEGY OF FELXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT(3).

SUMMARY

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19. WE AGREE WITH THE FUNDEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT (4). WHILE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOES NOT PROVIDE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO AN ADEQUATE ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE POSTURE, THE TACTICAL USE OPTION IS AN ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES AND ITS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND MIGHT PROVIDE THE MEANS OF INDUCING THE ENEMY TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW. IN POSSESSING THIS OPTION, NATO COULD NOT BE THREATENED WITH A FORM OF ATTACK TO WHICH IT COULD NOT REPLY. IT COULD RESORT TO THE TACTICAL USE OPTION FOR DIRECT DEFENCE OR FOR DELIBERATE

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(1) PHASSE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 19
(2) REFER TO MC 161/74 FOR ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT
(3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 77,78
MC 14/3(FINAL), 16TH JANUARY, 1968, PARAGRAPHS 17 AND 22
(4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 81, QUOTED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THIS REPORT

ESCALATION (1). THEREFORE, THE OPTION FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS ONE LEG OF THE TRIAD, IS A CARDINAL COMPONENT IN NATO'S WHOLE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBILITY OF RESPONSE. IN THIS REGARD,THE GREATER THE

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CAPABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ATTACK, THE HIGHER THE THRESHOLD FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO. HOWEVER, IF NATO MUST ESCALATE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES, WE CONCLUDE THAT NATO CAN DEMONSTRATE ITS RESOLVE TO CONTINUE WITH NUCLEAR DEFENCE MEASURES THROUGH COMBINATIONS OF VARIOUS FACTORS SUCH AS DIFFERENT TARGETS,MAGNITUDE OF USE, LOCATION OF TARGETS INCLUDING USE IN AN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA, AND TIME OR DURATION OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE. SINCE POLITICAL GUIDANCE FOR FOLLOW-ON USE (PHASE III) WOULD, AMONG OTHER ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING AGREED NATO STRATEGY,NEED TO CONCENTRATE ON WAYS TO PROVIDE MORE EXCALATORY EVIDENCE, WE CONSIDER THE DETAILED TREATMENT OF THIS CRITICAL ELEMENT IN THEPHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT AS MOST USEFUL.

IV. FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME-INITIATION OF PHASE III

20. IN THEIR DISCUSSION OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT AND THIS RELATED PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' REPORT NPG MINISTERS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF THE SCOPE, PURPOSE AND TIMING OF PHASE III OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME. THE PHASE III TASK AS ENVISAGED BY THE NPG MINISTERS IN 1971(2) AS THE "FORMULATION OF POLICY GUIDANCE". THE MINISTERS DID NOT SEE FIT AT THAT TIME TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE TO GUIDE THE PHASE III EFFORT.

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(1) MC14/3, PARAGAPH 17(A) AND (B)
(2) NPG/D(71)7, 27TH JULY, 1971, PARAGRAPHS 9 AND 21

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02

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21. FROM ITS INCEPTION THE NPG HAS DEVOTED MUCH
ATTENTION TO PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PRINCIPAL PORDUCTS OF THIS EFFORT
ARE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE
TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO (3), GENERAL GUIDLEINES
OF CONSULTATION PROCEDURES ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEPONS(4),
SPECIAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE POSSIBLE USE OF ATOMIC
DEMOLITION MUNITIONS ADM (5), CONCEPT FOR THE ROLE OF THEATRE
NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCES IN ACE (6). IT WAS WITH THE SAME
CONVICTION THAT A DEPER AND MORE COMPRESHENSIVE EVALUATION
OF THE USE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONSIN THE CONTEXT OF NATO'S
STRATEGY OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE WOULD BE DESIRABLE,THAT
THE NPG INITTIATED THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME AS WELL
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(3) DPC/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970
(4) DPC/D(69)59, 20TH NOVEMBER, 1969
(5) DPC/D(70)60, 10TH DECEMBER, 1970
(6) DPC/D(70)59(REVISED), 21ST DECEMBER, 1972

AS A NUMBER OF OTHER STUDIES, SOME COMPLETED AND OTHERS
ON-GOING 1(), WHICH BEAR ON THE COMPLEX OF ISSUES SURROUNDING
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THE USE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MORE RECENTLY, FURTHER
EVALUATION HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REPORT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS REQUIRED BY THE NUNN AMENDMENT,
AS A RESULT OF WHICH WE EXPECT OTHER WORK TO BE CARRIED OUT
BY NATO. WE BELIEVE THESE EFFORTS TAKEN TOGETHER MAY
CONTRIBUTE TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OFAN OVERALL POLICY
FOR THE USE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO, AND THAT
PHASE III OF THE FOLLOWN USE WORK PROGRAMME MIGHT USEFULLY
BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THIS GOAL.

22. THE AIM OF PHASE II WOULD BE TO PRODUCE A
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF NATO'S CONCEPT FOR THE USE
OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DRAWING TOEGTHER IN ONE
PAPER THE CONCLUSIONS AND GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THE
BASIC POLICY DOCUMENTS. THIS SHOLD BE DESCRIBE NATO'S
THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AS WELL AS POLITICAL AND
MILITARY CONCEPTS FOR ITS USE.SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD
NOT SUPERSEDE THE PRESENT GUIDANCE, ALTHOUGH,WHEN
COMPLETED, IT MIGHT SHOW WHERE THAT GUIDANCE SHOULD BE
REFINED THE PHASE III APPROACH WOULD NATURALLY ENTAIL
A PROGRAMME CAREFULLY LAID DOWN TO TAKE ACCOUNTY NOT ONLY
OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT BUT ALSO OF ON-GOING
NPG WORK IN RELATED AREAS.

23. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE
WORK TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN FULFILMENT OF PHASE III, WE SUGGEST
THAT MINISTERS APPROVE, THE PROPOSAL SET
FORTH IN PRAGRAPH 22 ABOVE AND, AT THE SAME TIME, REQUEST
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO DEVELOP DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR
ITS INITIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE
AUTUMN 1975 NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

24. THE MINISTERS MAY WISH TO:

(A) TAKE NOTE OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT(2)

(B) DRAW ON THIS REPORT FOR THEIR DISCUSSION

(C) APPROVE, IN PRINCIPLE, THE PROPOSED APPROACH
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FOR PHASE III OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK
PROGRAMME SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 22 ABOVE;
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(1) AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE
(2) NPG/D(75)1, 27TH MARCH, 1975

(D) INVITE THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO
DEVELOP DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR ITS INITIATION

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AND IMPLEMENTATION TO BE CONSIDERED BY
MINISTERS AT THEIR AUTUMN 1975 MEETING.
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To: STATE
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